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Corruption in Italy is a constantly debated problem. However, it is largely framed as a moral and legal issue. This
piece suggests instead that the root of the corruption problem is political and constitutional, as it lies in the creation
and degeneration of clientelistic networks as the most straightforward way for the generation of political consensus
given the Italian context. Only a complete overhaul of the state’s fundamental structures, which unfortunately
appears unlikely, may diminish the role of clientelism and hence of its teratological developments.
The issue of corruption has never abandoned the
core of Italian political discussions, and
understandably so. Indeed the country’s situation is
invariably and significantly worse than its major
European partners in all corruption metrics, possibly
being the most corrupt among developed nations,
with an accelerating trend in recent decades.
Numerous studies have highlighted that corruption,
mainly defined by bribery, embezzlement, and other
forms of power abuse, is extremely costly for the
country, while it has certainly contributed to its
massive national debt, locking Italy in a trajectory of
endless stagnation and decline.
However, in the national press and political
communication in general, the problem is
overwhelmingly framed as a moral and legal issue.
Certainly these are important aspects of the matter.
But this is also not the most productive approach,
neither intellectually, nor from a practical
perspective, and the lack of substantial progress over such a very long period of time should prompt some deeper
reflection and re-formulation of the basic question.
Instead of concentrating on a moral and criminal-legal narrative, it is time to address the problem as a political
question. The root of Italy’s corruption problem is mainly political, i.e. it is a structural feature of how political
consensus is created and can be created in the country.
 
How can a regime enhance its consensus base?  
Every political regime, democratic or non-democratic, anywhere and in any age, needs consensus. How can political
leadership possibly gain such consensus from the society? At close scrutiny, it is arguable that there exist only a
limited number of ways to achieve it, in practice only the following four:
Consensus is reached by rational discussion and consensus-making procedures as well as institutions in the
context of a highly developed civil society (Habermas’s public sphere). This is (or used to be) the prevailing
model of Nordic societies, or the Netherlands, and partly in UK, Germany, France. The creation of a highly
developed civil society is the key to achieve this consensus making model, but there is no clear recipe on how
to build one, and historically this may take rather unique circumstances as well as numerous generations.
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Consensus is built by means of force, i.e. political violence and/or the threat thereof. This can be very
effective in limited cases for limited amounts of time, raises grave ethical questions, and it is certainly
extremely costly.
Consensus is built on the foundations provided by the authority ( auctoritas facit legem) and prestige of certain
individuals, or organisations. The authority of the state is largely reflected in the respect paid to its symbols.
Authority is gained historically as a stratification of positive results, even resistance to oppression and
martyrdom, as well as military victories.
Consensus is fundamentally traded in exchange for (direct or indirect) economic benefits financed with public
resources, whether legal or even against the law, and in this second case one may have what is usually
considered as corruption in a technical sense. An arrangement for consensus making based on continuous
and immediate quid pro quo (clientelism) can function smoothly for quite a long time, until the leadership runs
out of resources to distribute, also as a consequence of negative feedback effects generated by this very
system on economic wealth production.
Every government gains consensus from the society utilizing a mix of these four methods, according to the available
resources: authority and prestige, force and the ability/opportunity to use it, a strong civil society (if available),
economic wealth.
 
The specificities of consensus making in Italy
In the case of Italy, one has to wonder what instruments the state possesses to enhance consensus, particularly
within a constitutional order which allows high political fragmentation and de facto veto powers to numerous actors
within a centralised structure.
1. It is well known that Italy has a fairly undeveloped civil society in comparison to other Western nations,
despite claims that civil society has made some progress in the past decades. Even so, the role of rational
discussion in the Italian context remains quite limited, and so its consensus-generating power.
2. Large-scale use of force is clearly illegal and, at least at the moment, not viable in the current constitutional as
well as international (especially European) context, not to mention the prevailing political culture. It remains
therefore confined to emergency situations and/or checking extremist political actors (subversive groups,
terrorists, etc).
3. The Italian state has little authority and cannot extract much consensus on the basis of the perceived prestige
emanating from its symbols, its institutions and from its key political representatives, who have little
achievement to show, either on the political or economic front, in the past decades, and certainly in the
lifetime of most Italian citizens. The state presents itself instead often in the decaying image of dilapidated
public buildings (especially schools, so that children learn about the condition of their state from the very
beginning), inefficient and Kafkaesque bureaucracy, political figures of abysmal incompetence and non-
existent communication skills, who can even provoke a certain nostalgia for the era of Andreotti.
Against this background, it should be no surprise that consensus has been constructed on the basis of an economic
exchange, which often leads to corruption. Corruption is practically unavoidable in the structure of the Italian political
landscape and constitution. It is simply the extension into illegal territory of widespread (legal) practices going on for
decades, such as for instance, among many others, the expansion beyond any reasonable measure of the number
of public employees (Sicily’s park rangers are 28,000 against 16,000 in the US national park service), tax
exemptions for entire categories (e.g. properties of the Catholic Church, and so on), exorbitant privileges for
numerous civil servants or politicians and their families, pensions, public contracts, the €80 bonus enacted by Renzi,
or the proposed “citizenship income” (reddito di cittadinanza). However irritating, these practices are constitutive of
political consensus. During the corruption scandals which shook the country in the mid-1990s and brought to an end
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the so called first Republic, former PM Bettino Craxi made clear in his defence that certain corruption practices were
indeed the inevitable aspect of consensus building, with little to no alternative within that given context. Although he
was, as he publicly admitted, legally culpable, his historical and political point remains valid, even more so since,
after those scandals and the related legal inquiries, corruption practices have continued undiminished to the present.
They cannot abate or simply disappear, they are a constitutive and irreplaceable part of the consensus making,
which is essential for the existence of the state.
This does not mean, of course, that corruption ought to be accepted given its inevitability in the present context. It
means however that it cannot be eradicated, or at least greatly constrained, unless consensus building by other
means becomes possible. Again, this is a political question, not only an ethical and legal one.
As an aside, the recurrent framing of corruption as an ethical problematique ( la questione etica) appears furthermore
grounded on a simplistic view of ethics itself, and the morality of the state and of public life more in general, as if
principles of public morality were indeed uncontroversial, obvious to anyone, their non-observance being due solely
to sheer lack of good will. This is not so. Without going into the details of complex and century-old philosophical
discussions, one should wonder what can be the source of morality, given the historical shift away from the
traditional sources of ethical norms grounded, in the case of Italy, in Catholic doctrines, and a massive work of de-
construction of societal “values” which has not been followed by any meaningful re-construction. Ethical norms do
not hang in the air.
 
The question of state authority
If corruption is practically inevitable in the current prospects for consensus making, in order to tackle it one must
think of reducing clientelism by strengthening other practices. Excluding the outright use of force, it only remains the
enhancement of the authority of the state, and the construction of a thicker and better functioning civil society
capable of rational discussion. This latter has been and still is the main idea of any modernisation project, including
the programmatic goal of a system of continental governance like the EU, but it has proved to be elusive, for reasons
which would be too long and complex to address in this piece.
The enhancement of the authority of the state and its institutions appears therefore in theory as the only element
within the consensus-making mix which can be significantly expanded, thus allowing for a reduction in clientelism
and corruption. In practice however, things are not at all that simple.
A brief historical digression is necessary at this point. Italy as a unified country was born out of revolutions and wars
in 1861 as the Kingdom of Italy, under the leadership of the Savoy dynasty. There is no doubt that the king and his
army (the primary institution of that time) enjoyed a remarkable prestige capital acquired during the “national
liberation” of Risogimento, a prestige which lasted well into the twentieth century until 1943 with alternate fortunes
(the monarchy was finally abolished by referendum on 2nd June 1946). For an overwhelmingly agricultural society
such as Italy in the second half of the nineteenth century, and where only a tiny fraction of the population had the
right to vote (suffrage by census), the problem of consensus was limited to a small elite in a few urban contexts,
aristocratic families, and the Church. The vast mass of citizens lived in the countryside according to traditional forms
of local socio-economic organisation, with limited political participation at national level. The newly unified Italian
state was created with a strongly centralised structure, similar to the Prussian model, where the country was divided
in provinces, each run by an appointee of the King’s government: the prefect. This model accounted for no
substantial diversity, which is instead astonishing in Italy at all level (geographical, historical, cultural, even
linguistic), and it was therefore flawed from the very start.
With the early industrialisation at the turn of the century, vast masses of Italians became increasingly politicised, and
the fabrication of consensus increasingly complex. As in other European countries, nationalism was widely
harnessed for mass mobilisation. However, Italian nationalism has always been peculiar, as Italians do not fit well
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any definition of nation: there is indeed something in common among Italians, but it is probably too thin to build a
classical nation state on it. As the sheer prestige of the Savoy dynasty was no longer sufficient, the country sought
for additional narratives of unity within a centralised state. Fascism provided one based on the myth of Rome, but it
was anachronistic, little credible, and got eventually destroyed by the war. After 1945 the new constitution
substantially inherited the administrative structure of the previous era. Regions were created, but only the five
regions with special status (Valle D’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sicily, and Sardinia)
gained some degree of autonomy, while the rest were not even fully functioning institutions until the 1970s, and still
they are a curious half-backed local institution with limited powers, high costs, unclear jurisdiction.
The whole question of national identity was bracketed and pushed aside while Italy  was kept together more by the
geopolitical pressures characterising the Cold War period than any national discourse. Not surprisingly, as the Cold
War came to an end, the question of unity and national identity resurfaced, being clumsily articulated, and
unfortunately largely wasted, by the Northern League movement. This is very regrettable, because the question of
national unity, of the authority of the state, of consensus making, and public morality or absence thereof is one and
the same. Since politics has become mass politics, the centralised state model of 1861 has proved itself
fundamentally inadequate to govern Italy.
Collective identity in Italy has always found its main dimension at local level, in a plethora of small fatherlands, a
feeling normally termed campanilismo, from the word campanile, namely bell tower, the powerful symbol of local
identity and continuity with the past. The Italian state, whether monarchical, fascist, or republican has constantly
antagonised campanilismo and local identities, but has been unable to propose a better identity narrative, if any.
This has been a strategic mistake. Instead of fighting the local, Italy should have embraced it and make it productive.
 
Federalisation as a possible solution
Why does this matter in the corruption discourse? Because if there is any way by which the state can regain a
modicum of prestige and credibility in the long run, therefore improving its ability of generating consensus without
systematic clientelism, is to enhance popular participation, which is only possible by means of bringing the centre of
political decision-making closer to the citizenry, i.e. at local/regional level. The centralised state where decisions are
made in Rome is hopelessly discredited and will probably never recover. Rome is as far as a foreign country for the
vast majority of Italians in different regions. Although this may sound awkward, it is a common perception within
Italy. The best model of governance is paradoxically the one Italy has never adopted, namely federalism. Numerous
political forces have recognised the existence of this problem and the value of decentralisation, including (in
principle) the recently attempted constitutional reforms by Renzi, but they have been hopelessly unambitious. The
best constitutional structure for Italy would be a federation on the Swiss model, with minimal powers for a federal
government sitting in some provincial town (Perugia for instance), and all other powers to the region (some regions
should perhaps be geographically re-defined), including fiscal policies, education, police, healthcare.
The only way to answer the moral question is a complete overhaul of the current constitution and model of
governance, including the symbols of the current Italian state (flag, anthem, and seal), reconnecting the country to its
fragmented identity by embracing it. This appears to be, by the way, also one of the few means by which in the
(very) long term civil society can be re-constructed. It would also allow the creation of new identity discourses
recovering the historical image of the golden age of Italy, namely the late-Middle Ages and Renaissance, when
fragmentation was the engine of an astonishing productivity, harnessing inter-regional rivalry and competition.
Will this happen? It is extremely unlikely that a constitutional change in a federalist direction will occur in the lifetime
of anybody reading this piece. The current trajectory of the country is precisely the contrary. With the continuous
worsening of the economic situation, Italians are systematically embracing narratives of self-deception, according to
which cosmetic reforms would bring about a change which changes nothing, particularly perpetuating the long list of
acquired rights/privileges on which the current consensus-making system is based, even if it is no longer financially
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sustainable. The country is indeed changing, and profoundly, but for the wrong reasons and passively. It endures the
change, it does not dominate or steer it, the historical hallmark of bad politics. There is a feedback loop between
citizens and elites which continuously reinforces immobilism and self-deception. The vast majority of citizens are not
willing to make substantial changes to their lifestyle, as shown by their electoral preferences. Political elites are
absolutely unwilling to change either, if not, as mentioned, in cosmetic terms, for fear of losing their party-politics
career, and thus seek to strengthen immobilism in their electorate by ideological means. Worse still, Italy’s
leadership operates in a political-cultural horizon in which strategic initiatives cannot even be conceptualised (a
widespread problem within the EU establishment). Besides, reforms which would be required at this juncture in order
to fundamentally alter the course of the country, as argued elsewhere, would appear unacceptably draconian and
certainly unconstitutional.
 
Conclusions
The Republic of Italy or effectively Italy as a unified geopolitical entity finds itself today on a trajectory of terminal
decline as a modernist experiment. The perspective ahead is unfortunately not one whereby the upcoming financial
shocks will finally burst the constraints of an immobilist mentality and a wrong state architecture, but it may
paradoxically strengthen them.
The point of Italy’s moral question, of clientelism and corruption, even of many forms of organised crime ( mafia), is
not only an ethical and criminal one, but has political origins rooted in the constitutional structure as a centralised
state, a model which fails to mobilise the citizens, to enhance civil society, and does not account for the historical
conditions of the country. Clientelism and corruption are simple tools for the creation of consensus, which is always
a political necessity, in the substantial absence of other mechanisms of consensus-making.
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